Behavioural researchers often seek to experimentally manipulate, measure, and analyse latent volatile psychological attributes, such as memory, confidence, or attention. The best measurement strategy is often difficult to intuit. Classical psychometric theory, mostly focused on individual differences in stable attributes, offers little guidance for the measurement of within-subject latent variables. Hence, measurement methods in experimental research are often based on tradition, and differ between communities.
Introduction
When planning behavioural experiments, researchers must decide which observables to collect (observation), and how to pre-process and transform them (transformation), before performing statistical analysis. In many fields of behavioural science and psychology, there are no hard criteria to make these decisions, although they can have a drastic impact on the conclusions from a given study (Steegen et al., 2016; Silberzahn et al., 2018; Lonsdorf et al., 2019b) . Often they are based on common laboratory practice or expert consensus (e.g. Blumenthal et al., 2005; Boucsein et al., 2012) , under the implicit assumption that tradition and expertise have evolved to approximate the best method. However, recent research has highlighted a wide variability in observation (e.g. Ojala and Bach, 2019) and transformation (Silberzahn et al., 2018; Lonsdorf et al., 2019b; Lonsdorf et al., 2019a ) methods, and even seemingly mundane questions such as how to exclude "outlier" reaction times lead to conflicting opinions (Simmons et al., 2011) .
In this paper we develop a quantitative criterion for evaluating measurement methods in the context of experimental research, where we define a measurement method as the combination of an observation and a transformation method. We ground our approach in classical validity theory, and seek to surmount its shortcomings by integrating metrological concepts from technology. In a worked example that runs through the paper, we illustrate the challenges and our proposed solutions. In doing so, our aim is to place the choice of measurement methods on a sound empirical footing, and to provide a means to quantify measurement uncertainty (Rigdon et al., 2020) .
The first section of the paper explores the goal of measurement in experimental research.
The second section investigates classical psychometric concepts. In the third section, we mathematically derive the core concept of retrodictive validity. Most of this section can be skipped by readers less interested in mathematical detail. The fourth section integrates the calibration concept from technology with psychometrics. Most importantly for practitioners, in the fifth section we discuss implications and possible applications to experimental psychology.
Inferring psychological attributes
We constrain our focus to the experimental study of the human mind, which includes many fields of psychology. For the moment, we exclude research that contains no notion of an unobservable mind, that is, models without reflective latent variables (e.g., network models of psychopathological symptoms (Bringmann and Eronen, 2018) , or "functional" approaches (Houwer, 2011) ). Also, we do not address the non-experimental measurement of stable psychological attributes such as personality or intelligence.
As the mind is not directly observable, its attributes are assessed from observable behaviour, such as verbal expressions, motor responses, or physiological processes. Thus, the psychological inverse problem is how to infer an unobservable psychological attribute from an observed measure (Houwer, 2011) . Psychological attributes are termed "constructs" in classical validity theory (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) ; but this term has ambiguous meaning in the psychometric literature (Borsboom et al., 2009 ), such that we use "attribute" here.
Many sciences face similar inverse problems as psychology (Houwer, 2011) . For example, physical forces, torques or even simple distances, are by definition unobservable attributes that can only be inferred through their interaction with objects by a suitable measurement model (Estler, 1999) , and they may not even "exist" in a meta-physical sense. Physics has developed a long and rich tradition of iteratively refining measurement of such attributes (Kuhn, 1962) . We will exploit this tradition by borrowing metrological concepts used in physics and industrial technology.
Historically, different branches of psychology have developed a range of solutions to the inverse problem. In one prototypical approach, often termed "operationism" in experimental contexts and formally described by classical test theory (Novick, 1966) , individual measures (or sums of measures) are taken to be a noisy linear transformation of the psychological attribute. Statistical tests are performed directly on observed data (or sum scores thereof). In an extension of this approach, observables can be transformed to compress series of data points (e. g. averaging, or peak-scoring of data time series), to exclude "outlier" data points before or after compression, or to alter their distribution.
These transformations are based on heuristic measurement models. Other fields have developed explicit measurement models to estimate psychological attributes, which entail different sources of variability, non-linear mappings, and interactions between psychological attributes, and/or observables. Examples include item-response theory (Embretson and Reise, 2013) , expected utility models in behavioural economics (Camerer, 1995) , driftdiffusion models in decision psychology (Forstmann et al., 2016) , psychophysiological models (Bach and Friston, 2013; Bach et al., 2018b) , and associative learning theory (Mathys et al., 2011) . Structural equation models provide a generic formalism to describe the relation between the psychological attributes themselves, and between psychological attributes and observables (Bollen, 1989; Muthén, 2002) . For many applications, however, different measurement models co-exist, and the same model can be implemented in various ways (e.g., using, differently pre-processed observables).
In order to compare these strategies, the key challenge is to quantify "how well" a measurement method infers the psychological attribute in question. Given hypothetical repetitions of the measurement (on the same subject, at the same time), "good inference" can be decomposed into two components: low variability of the inferred attribute under constant true scores (precision, i.e. low random measurement error), and low average distance from the true scores (trueness, i.e. low systematic measurement error), a common distinction in statistics and measurement theory (BIPM, 2012) . We note that "trueness" is often termed "accuracy", a term which over time adopted a different meaning in metrology, such that we use "trueness" here.
Worked example 1: quantifying implicit learning
To illustrate the practical challenge, we consider a group of clinical psychologists who are interested in psychotherapy development. Imagine they have proposed a novel technique to reduce (implicit) aversive memory, and wish to evaluate their intervention by experimentally creating aversive associations and then reducing them with their novel method. To this end, they conduct an experiment in which a person associates a geometric cue with an electric shock (a procedure often termed "fear conditioning"), and they measure the ensuing associative memory before and after the intervention. This associative memory ("fear memory") is not directly observable; instead the psychologist will observe the person's skin conductance response to the geometric symbol, under the assumption that this physiological observable is influenced by implicit memory for the electric shock. The inferential problem is then to find the best possible way of quantifying the attribute "fear memory" from the observed skin conductance response. Previous research has suggested at least three different measurement models for doing so (Bach et al., 2009; Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010; Boucsein et al., 2012) , and each contains pre-processing settings that can take an arbitrary number of values.
An even more general question is whether to base the inference on skin conductance responses at all, or on another observable such as startle eye blink responses. This question concerns the selection of observables and entails additional challenges which we will return to later on. For the moment, we will focus on how to evaluate different data transformation methods or measurement models for a given set of observables.
Classical psychometric concepts: construct validity and reliability
A textbook perspective holds that measurement methods should be valid and reliable (Shadish et al., 2002) . While these are crucial concepts, what we argue in the following is that in their rather general sense they do not provide unique quantitative criteria to infer trueness and precision of an experimental assessment of a volatile psychological attributes. This is why we seek to refine them.
The most generic notion of validity is construct validity (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Cronbach, 1988) , developed in the context of assessing (relatively) stable personality and ability attributes with many-item tests (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) . As special cases, this encompasses more singular concepts such as criterion validity or content validity (Cronbach, 1988) . To assess construct validity, researchers form a "nomological net" that defines how the attribute, in theory, relates to other attributes or observables. An estimate of the attribute is considered valid if it occupies the same place in the nomological net as the attribute itself (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) , exemplified in a multi-trait-multi-method matrix (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) . Notably however, "construct validity cannot generally be expressed in the form of a single simple coefficient" (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) : validity is a collective interpretation of many different relations in the nomological net. Nomological nets can usually only be formulated in a vague way, such as: the correlation between attribute A and observable B should be rather high (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; van der Maas et al., 2011) . This means that there is no universal guidance on how to interpret small, incremental changes in some of these relations, due to different measurement methods.
While design-oriented multi-method models have grounded the integration and comparison of different measurement methods into a thorough theoretical framework, they do not provide a simple coefficient to quantify validity either (Eid et al., 2016) . To summarise, construct validity is not precise enough a concept to evaluate how well a particular method allows inferring a psychological attribute, especially in an experimental context.
Classical conceptualisations of reliability, on the other hand, assess how interindividual differences in the measurement are stable across repetitions -for example, over time or over test items. This does not address measurement trueness (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) , and indeed improving reliability may even reduce trueness. For example, if one replaces a standard intelligence test with a measurement of index finger length, the inferred attribute will be very reliable, but is unlikely to have a strong (or indeed, any) relation with actual intelligence. Thus, as noted before (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) , interpreting reliability metrics requires a criterion to guarantee trueness. We will later show that our proposed criterion simultaneously assesses trueness and precision. We will conclude that once trueness is established, it can be useful to include reliability into the evaluation of a measure. This is why we highlight a few more challenges of the reliability concept in experimental contexts. First, the number of observables is usually limited, often to one observable at a time, such that stability over observables cannot be assessed. Secondly, because we are concerned with volatile attributes, assessing stability of measurement requires ensuring that the attribute itself is stable over measurements, which requires a calibration approach.
Third, as Brandmaier et al. (2018) illustrate, under constant measurement precision, reliability scales with interindividual variability in the psychological attribute. However, experimental manipulations have often evolved to minimise, rather than maximise, individual differences in the psychological attribute (Hedge et al., 2018) , which minimises metrics of reliability. Without strong assurance of trueness, reliability can be erroneously increased by inferring a different attribute that has higher interindividual variability. Fourth, when interindividual variability and temporal volatility of the attribute are on the same order of magnitude, stable hidden confounds with high interindividual variability become important. As an example, systematic differences in skin composition can multiplicatively scale skin conductance responses, and thereby can have an impact on differences between experimental conditions. This interindividual variability is presumably much more stable than interindividual variability in the psychological attribute, which will likely result in lower reliability once such confounds are accounted for.
Despite not providing a single numerical criterion for measurement evaluation, validity theory provides us with three important insights that will help in moving forward. The first is that a high proportion of variance in the measure of the attribute should be due to variance in the true scores of the attribute (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) -in other words, correlation between measured and true score should be maximal. In the construct validity framework, this correlation cannot be quantified, because the true scores are unknown. The second insight is that as a substitute, correlation with a single criterion can sometimes be used to evaluate a measure, if that criterion captures all or most variance in the true score. In validity theory, this is usually an outcome influenced by the psychological attribute (predictive validity) or another attribute related to the attribute in question (concurrent validity). The third insight is that psychological attributes can be externally influenced, and that this can be used to evaluate their validity (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) . This is not a dominant theme in classical validity theory, which mostly deals with temporally stable attributes such as personality. Here, however, we are concerned with volatile attributes that can be externally manipulated. In this case, we show how the correlation between the intended and measured values of the attribute in a calibration experiment can become a surrogate criterion. In the next section, we derive a mathematical formalism and provide the boundary conditions under which this quantity is diagnostic about the quality of the measurement method. Readers less interested in mathematical detail may skip this section and continue with the section on calibration.
Figure 1. Retrodiction and calibration. A:
A standardised experiment with intended attribute scores e generates true scores t. The estimated attribute, y, is generated by transforming some observed data. Retrodictive validity denotes the observable correlation between e and y, and is influenced by the measurement error as well as by the correlation between experimental aberration and measurement error, cor(ω, ε). B: The calibration process. Expert consensus defines calibration experiments. Different observables and transformations can be optimised and evaluated. The calibration report is fed back to the community and inspires refined calibration experiments, observables, and measurement models.
Retrodictive validity
Before deriving our main results, we define a few key terms (see figure 1A for illustration).
As in classical test theory and other true score theories (Lord, 1965; Novick, 1966) , we assume the existence of true scores of a psychological attribute, which we denote t.
Extending true score theories, we further decompose t into a trait-like baseline value (which we are not interested in) and a volatile component that is subject to established experimental manipulation. With this experimental manipulation, we seek to achieve intended differences in t; we denote these experimentally intended values with e. We assume that we are interested in an error-free measurement of the true score by some observable quantity. We make no assumption on the measurement model that is used to estimate the true score from the observable, and we denote this estimate of the true score with y. Thus, when we evaluate y, we evaluate the observation method together with a measurement model or transformation method. We assume that y, t, and (if it takes more than two values) e are at least on interval scale level. We further emphasise that we treat e, t, and y as linearly related but we are not interested in the coefficients of these linear transformations or in the actual numerical values of t. We believe this is well justified in the context of experimental research, where psychological attributes often do not have a natural scale.
Our goal is to evaluate trueness and precision of y. To this end, we propose to use the correlation between intended and estimated scores, Cor(e, y). We term this type of criterion validity "retrodictive validity", since the aim is to retrodict the (experimentally induced) differences of the psychological attribute. Note that we have previously termed this property "predictive validity" (Bach and Friston, 2013; Bach et al., 2018b) , but this term is reserved in classical validity theory such we decided to avoid it here.
In the remainder of this section, we formally derive the conditions under which retrodictive validity is informative about trueness and precision of y. In doing so, we use the formalism of linear regression models, but we do not seek to invoke any implicit assumptions about the identifiability of parameters, or about error distributions; all assumptions are explicitly stated. Our argument is strictly on the sample level. We will show under what conditions we can infer maximisation of the sample correlation Cor(t, y) under observed maximisation of the sample correlation Cor(e, y). Future work will explore how the uncertainty of these correlations as estimators of population correlations propagates, and what should be minimum required improvements in Cor(e, y). In the following, we seek to illustrate this approach with a practical scenario based on our worked example.
Scenario 1. A Retrodiction experiment (measuring aversive memory): A group of researchers
believes that coupling cues with electric shocks impacts on aversive memory with (unknown) true score t. They propose to measure the values of t with a particular observable and a measurement model to arrive at an estimate y of the true score. Before doing their retrodiction experiment, they define intended differences of the attribute, e, with respect to baseline. If there are only two intended values, then their numerical values do not matter, since the scale and offset of t is arbitrary anyway. In this (common) case, e will merely encode the ordering of conditions. If there are more than two levels, then the values of e can be derived from a (semi-)quantitative theory. For example, classical associative learning theory, established on a range of different observables, predicts that there is no difference from baseline aversive memory if cue A was never coupled with punishment (e = 0); that there is higher than baseline aversive memory if cue B was always coupled with punishment (e = 1); and that the difference from baseline aversive memory for a cue C has half the size of that for B if an association was established with compound cue CX (e = 0.5).
We take a repeated measurement under m > 1 levels, j = 1, ..., m, of the experimental manipulation, in a sample of n subjects i = 1, ..., n. Let "# be the intended change of the psychological attribute, "# the true score of the attribute, and "# the estimated true score, in subject i and condition j.
First, we write t as a function of e. We are only interested in score differences between conditions, and not in (possibly trait-like) baseline values, and so include a subject-specific intercept term in our model. Next, the difference in t will usually deviate from e -we term this experimental aberration. Aberration can be decomposed into two terms. The first is a systematic (i.e. across subjects) misspecification of e, which reduces the trueness of the experimental model. This is illustrated in Figure 2A where the black line denotes the actual non-linear dependency between e and t, which is contrasted to our model of a linear relationship denoted by the grey line. The second reason is variation in the effectiveness of the manipulation, such that for the same value of e, t takes different values in different subjects -this means the model of our experimental manipulation is imprecise. This is illustrated by the distribution of red dots in Figure 2A which depict the true score differences under a constant value of e. Taken together, we can write the true score in a non-linear model:
Here, '" is an (unknown) subject-specific baseline value of the attribute, the (unknown) mapping from e to changes in t, > 0 a scalar, and "# an (unknown) imprecision term that captures variations in between subjects as well as variation in the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation.
Since we are only interested in correlations, that is linear dependencies, we decompose this equation (1) into a linear part and a residual (R) non-linearity 4 :
where ̅ " is the (unknown) within-subject average of "# (see appendix). We can see in Figure   2A that if there are just two levels of e, then 4 * "# + is (almost) zero, but this is not the case for more than two levels of e ( Figure 2D ). In this case, 4 denotes systematic aberration in our model of the experimental manipulation, while "# denotes aberration due to imprecision in the experimental manipulation. For mathematical convenience, we have rescaled both aberration terms to the same scale as e. Since we cannot empirically separate these aberration terms, we combine them into a total (T) aberration 9"# ∶= 4 * "# + + "# .
Thus, our final experimental model is:
Next, we write the estimated score y as a function of the true score t (see Figure 2B ). Again, we assume a potential systematic misspecification in the measurement model, that is, an lack of trueness, and a subject-specific error "# , that is, an imprecision. Then we can write "# = '" + * "# + + "# ; (4) where '" is a subject-specific baseline, and > 0 a scalar. Because we are only interested in linear dependencies, we again rewrite this as the sum of a linear term and a residual nonlinearity, noting that we cannot generally assume 4 * "# + = 0:
"# = @ " + * "# − ̅ " + + 4 * "# + + "# . (5) Here, @ " is the within-subject average of the estimated score (see appendix). For convenience, we have expressed the measurement error on the same scale as e. We denote the total error 9"# ∶= 4 * # + + "# such that our final true score model is:
The correlation between true score differences and measured differences, E,G = Cor* "# − '" , "# − @ " +, is jointly influenced by the trueness (via 4 * "# +) and the precision (via "# ) of the measure y, and we seek to maximise both. Empirically, however, we can only assess the correlation K,G = Cor* "# , "# − @ " + (see Figure 2C ), which we have termed retrodictive validity. Thus, we seek to determine under which conditions retrodictive validity K,G says something about E,G , the correlation between true and estimated scores. We will see that this depends on L,M = Cor* 9"# , 9"# +, the correlation between the experimental aberration, and the total measurement error.
Lemma.
( A geometrical proof is given in the appendix.
In the following, we explain this Lemma and give an intuition about how it can be used. In general it is reasonable to assume L,M = 0, i.e. that the correlation between the experimental aberration and measurement errors is zero. In this case, increasing K,G also increases E,G . This is a standard case and will apply in most circumstances. Otherwise, if L,M is positive, or the measurement error is large compared to the experimental aberration, then selecting a measure y with maximal K,G may still either ensure large E,G , but could also decrease L,M (i.e. make aberration and error more anticorrelated). If L,M is already negative and below the bound stated above (implying that the measurement error is small compared to the experimental aberration), then increasing K,G may actually reduce E,G and thereby, trueness and/or precision of y. In the scenarios below, we explore situations where the assumption L,M = 0 is violated but we note that we regard them as edge cases. Later on, we will recommend including with every calibration report an analysis of the plausibility of this assumption. In return, we would ask reviewers of calibration reports not to interpret the absence of hard evidence for or against this assumption as a reason to reject it, since hard evidence may be difficult to come by.
We note that if two measures of t have exactly the same retrodictive validity, then trueness and precision can be decomposed by assessing reliability, which is affected only by precision and not by trueness (Brandmaier et al., 2018) : the estimate with higher reliability will have higher precision and lower trueness, and vice versa.
In what follows we demonstrate features of this approach in different concrete experimental contexts. Figure 2 KL) . To define intended score differences e, they take advantage of the previous picture ratings. However, in this hypothetical example, subjects' reported valence follows their true (i.e. actually experienced) subjective valence by a sigmoid function ( Figure 2K) . The relation between the previous ratings (intended scores) and the actually induced true scores is thus the perfect inverse of this function ( Figure 2J) . Hence, the relation between intended valence, and valence measured by self-report, will be almost perfectly linear (Figure 2L, red dots) , while the novel measure has a lower correlation with e. At the request of a reviewer, the researchers repeat their analysis by using pairs of levels of e. This removes (almost) all systematic aberration from the relation between e and t, and consequently the two measures showed equally good retrodictive validity in this analysis. To the researchers (who don't know about the true relationship between e, t, and y) this means that there must be an systematic aberration in the specification of e or a systematic error in the measurement of y.
Proposed solution: for multiple values of e, always perform an auxiliary analysis on pairs of levels, thus removing anticorrelated systematic aberration and trueness . If this auxiliary analysis consistently yields conclusions that are different from the primary analysis, then further investigation is required.
Worked example 2: a retrodiction experiment
The proposed method hinges on the existence of experimental manipulations that affect one psychological attribute in a relatively specific manner. Here we extend our worked example. The association of coloured circles with electric shocks in the absence of any intervention is assumed to provide a manipulation of "fear memory": a person is exposed to one colour predicting the absence of the electric shock (CS-) and another colour predicting the possibility of shock (CS+). A plethora of research has demonstrated this type of learning in various dependent measures, and it is uncontroversial that CS+ and CS-are differently associated with the electric shock in healthy individuals. Any experimental method that recovers this difference can be seen as a measure of fear memory. Observing skin conductance responses to CS+ and CS-, and transforming this observable into a measure of fear memory, is one such method. Maximising retrodictive validity in this experiment could thus maximise joint accuracy and precision to infer fear memory.
This example serves to highlight the substantive questions associated with the proposed approach. The first question is whether a manipulation can be entirely specific. In our example, some theories posit that at least two independent forms of aversive memory are established concurrently: implicit and declarative memory (Bechara et al., 1995; Lovibond and Shanks, 2002) . In this case, the manipulation would affect both attributes, with possibly different experimental aberration. By maximising retrodictive validity, one may unintentionally prioritise the contribution of the lower-aberration attribute (e.g. declarative memory) to the estimated score, over the higher-aberration one (e.g. implicit learning). It appears unlikely that this could happen when comparing two different measurement models for the same observable. However, it has been suggested that different observables -skin conductance and startle eye-blink, for example -are influenced to a different degree by implicit and declarative memory (Soeter and Kindt, 2010) . In this case, basing the choice of observables on retrodictive validity in this specific experiment may be problematic. Of course, if psychological attributes are generally indistinguishable by observation, then it makes limited sense to separate them theoretically.
A second question is the specificity of the estimated score. For example, skin conductance responses are influenced not only by fear memory but by a range of other psychological attributes (Boucsein, 2012) . We can carefully ensure these other attributes are not affected in the retrodiction experiment. However, if they are not held constant in the substantive experiment, then inference on the psychological attribute is limited. We thus suggest to include in a calibration report a list of attributes that are known to confound the measure and that must be held constant in any future experiment.
Notably, these issues limit behavioural measures independent of which approach we select to validate them. Here, we suggest making these issues explicit by specifying validity conditions for a calibration procedure.
Calibration
We are now in a situation that is commonplace in technology. We seek to measure an unobservable attribute, and evaluate a measurement procedure under controlled circumstances. This process is often termed calibration and can be broken up into several parts (Phillips et al., 2001) .
Defining the measurand
First we need to define what is being measured in the calibration process (Phillips et al., 2001) , known as the measurand. As in standard technical and industrial applications, the measurand is "an idealized concept and it may be impossible to produce an actual gauge, artifact, or instrument, exactly to the specifications of the measurand" (Phillips et al., 2001) .
In the case of psychology, we suggest using an experimental manipulation that has a relatively specific impact on the psychological attribute in question. The specification of the procedure will depend on the substantive research field and will generally include a definition of the population from which the test sample is drawn.
For instance, in our worked example, we would start by defining all those aspects of the calibration experiment that are already known to influence the measurement: the time interval between conditioned and unconditioned stimulus, the inter-trial interval, and the reinforcement rate. We would also define the exact nature of the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli, and of the instructions. Physical variables such as the time of day and temperature/humidity need to be selected. We may furthermore define variables suspected to be less important but possibly relevant. To avoid being overly specific in terms of the validity conditions (see below), one may also define a series of calibration experiments to be carried out in different circumstances, for example, with different time intervals or unconditioned stimuli.
Validity conditions
The calibration results are only valid under the specified validity conditions, which should be similar to the conditions of the calibration procedure. These will be stated in the calibration report. We suggest putting particular emphasis on those external conditions and psychological attributes that are known to confound the measured attribute. In our worked example, this appears relatively unproblematic. The clinical researcher can establish associative memory in their study, run their intervention, and measure associative memory with exactly the same procedure as used in the calibration experiment. In the calibration report, they will note that the calibration experiment may possibly establish several concurrent forms of memory, and that it is unknown which one is measured by skin conductance.
Sometimes researchers may find it necessary to deviate from the specified validity conditions. This is again a standard case in technological application (Phillips et al., 2001) .
The calibration report can anticipate some of these cases. There will be situations where the deviation does not matter much. For example, there is no known reason why replacing easily discriminable coloured circles with easily discriminable coloured squares should change the precision of skin conductance responses as a fear memory measure. In other cases, one may suspect that the deviation matters. For example when operating under high-temperature
conditions, skin conductance responses may overlap in a non-linear way , and this can render the measurement model less appropriate. Some such cases may be corrected by suitable mathematical models, which can already be developed under calibration conditions. For example, a biophysical measurement model describing sweat expulsion and evaporation may include a temperature factor. Possibly, even the precision of the corrected values can be worked out beforehand.
Reporting the relationship
In technical calibration applications, the relationship between measured and reference values are usually reported as a trueness (mean error) and a precision term (Phillips et al., 2001) . In our case, these two terms cannot be separated and are jointly optimised. In order to select between different measurement methods, we suggest reporting retrodictive validity in absolute numbers on a known effect size scale. Calibration will often be carried out on finite samples under conditions of high aberration, and we would expect that the retrodictive validity ranking of different methods will be more generalisable than the actual effect sizes. Therefore, we suggest comparing several measurement methods in the same calibration experiment. Finally, we suggest reporting all empirical data and previous knowledge that may suggest the presence or absence of (anti)correlated experimental aberration and measurement error. For example, this may include known stable predictors of interindividual differences in the experimental effect on the observable, or known predictors of the dynamic range of the observable. In the case of more than two experimental levels, we suggest auxiliary analysis with pairs of levels to confirm the conclusions.
Iteration
The sample size of the calibration studies should be reasonably large, to avoid overfitting a method to the particular validation data set. Sample size is less of an issue if method optimization is understood as an iterative process, as it is in technology. Often, the goal is to compare different measurement models (or transformation methods) which can be applied retrospectively to previously acquired data sets. To facilitate this iterative process, we suggest that data from calibration experiments compiled across laboratories in standardized format (see Metzner et al., 2018 for an example in Computational Psychiatry), and shared via repositories such as Zenodo, Dryad or Psycharchives (for an example from our work, see https://www.zenodo.org/search?q=PsPM). Current developments in data management automation could possibly enable fully automated benchmark testing in the moment that an additional calibration data set is published.
Application
Precise knowledge of retrodictive validity allows selecting the best transformation method or measurement model for a given observable and can thus guide researchers in planning their data transformation. It can also help methodologists to improve a transformation method -by optimising numerical settings or selecting between different plausible measurement models (see Bach et al., 2018b for a review of examples). To avoid overfitting in the case of small improvements in small calibration samples, we suggest to always confirm any results in independent hold-out data sets. In the following, we suggest additional applications that can help to improve strategic research decisions.
Power analysis
A perennial problem with power analyses is that in many cases the size of a hypothesized effect is not known a priori. If work on a particular substantive question has already been published, current research and publication practises mean that reported effect sizes tend to overestimate the true effect sizes (Button et al., 2013) , thus biasing any power analysis.
However, what can be known is the retrodictive validity of a measurement method, which limits the maximum achievable effect size. This will often render it possible to compute minimum sample sizes, required under the best-case assumptions that an experimental manipulation has no variation. We have used this approach to reveal a case where the required minimum sample size even under best-case assumptions was higher than what is the standard in the field (Bach et al., 2018a) .
Study costing
Knowing the statistical power of different measurement methods allows economic costbenefit analysis. For a desired level of statistical power, it is easy to work out how many participants are required with different methods, and calculate the associated economic cost. On the other hand, implementing new measurement method may be expensive or difficult, for example, because it requires too many trials per participant, is computationally intensive, or requires re-training of research staff. These two cost factors can be pitted against one another.
Quality control
When keeping the measurement method constant, retrodictive validity is influenced by differences in experimental aberration, and thus can depend on laboratory standards and staff training. For example, testing in noisy rooms with many participants may result in lower retrodictive validity than testing in a quiet room. Quality assurance is essential in many fields of science, in particular where measurement methods are being commercially marketed.
Reporting quality assurance experiments can be a requirement for journal publications, for example to quantitatively demonstrate the specificity of biochemical reagents in molecular life sciences (Bijata et al., 2017) , or to demonstrate the desired influence of designer drugs on designer receptors in cellular neuroscience (Anacker et al., 2018) . This approach has been less pervasive in psychology, but retrodictive validity could enable such quality control. For example, several laboratories can run the exact same calibration experiments, use the same measurement method, and define standards for minimum acceptable effect sizes. Within a laboratory, trainees and students could be benchmarked to achieve a given level of retrodictive validity in a calibration experiment. We note that current research practices often implicitly incentivize large effect sizes in hypothesis tests, rather than in calibration experiments, which is arguably problematic for scientific training. Replacing these incentives with success in calibration experiments could potentially improve research culture.
Experimental design
Finally, one can use the retrodiction model to optimise experimental manipulations. Under the conditions outlined above, maximising retrodictive validity will then yield the experimental manipulation with lowest combined aberration and measurement error. This can aid experimental design. As an example, we have used this approach to empirically find the optimal number of trials to measure fear memory recall. Here, more trials mean less measurement error but at the same time reduction of the true effect due to extinction (i.e. an increase in aberration). The optimal balance is difficult to intuit but can be found empirically (Khemka et al., 2017) .
Discussion
We have argued that retrodictive validity is a framework for rational selection between, and optimisation of, measurement methods, and can be established and exploited in a calibration process. There are many examples of measurement models that abstract from particular hypotheses to be tested and can be widely applied across experimental settings.
We illustrated the proposed approach with a worked example from clinical psychophysiology, where a psychological attribute is inferred from observed physiological measures. We note that our approach also applies to non-behavioural measures, for example inferring cognitive variables from neuroimaging data, as in the example of pain research (Wager et al., 2013) .
As a limitation, the method does not allow separating lack of trueness and imprecision, but jointly improves on both. We have noted that assessment of reliability can, under suitable circumstances, help in disentangling these two. Furthermore, the method makes two crucial assumptions. First, that there exist experimental manipulations which affect a psychological attribute in a relatively specific manner. In many cases the specificity of a manipulation will not be known precisely; we note that this is a limitation for any measurement of psychological attributes and not just for the approach chosen here. A more specific assumption is that the experimental aberration (i.e. the difference between intended and achieved true scores of the psychological attribute) is not anticorrelated with the measurement error. We found it difficult to specify plausible cases where this assumption is violated, and our examples may appear somewhat constructed and hypothetical. However, if substantive research reveals circumstantial evidence for any such violations then the proposed method should be used with caution.
Tradition remains the mainstay of justification for data collection and pre-processing methods in many subfields of psychology, but this comes with a range of theoretical, statistical, and practical problems, including low reproducibility. Widespread researcher degrees of freedom have been criticized (Simmons et al., 2011) , and there are increasing calls to plan and pre-register data pre-processing before a study is being conducted (Munafò et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2018) . This leaves research practitioners in the uncomfortable situation of having to select between methods without good reason. Collecting huge samples increases reproducibility but imposes a heavy cost if the method itself is not optimised. Here, we propose a novel generic solution that can be applied across different branches of psychology. Crucially, our approach could potentially alleviate several of the major challenges that experimental psychology is currently confronted with. With this analysis, we hope to move towards rational criteria for the choice of research methods.
Appendix.
Retrodiction model
Here we restate and explicate eq. (3) and (6) from the main text.
where t i = 1 n m j=1 t ij is the (unknown) within-subject average value of the attribute, and γe ij is the orthogonal projection of the mean-centred sample vector (t ij − t i ) onto e ij ; we assume γ > 0 (i.e. that there is some -possibly small -correlation between the intended and the achieved true scores).
where y i = 1 n m j=1 y ij is the within-subject average of the estimated score, and β(t ij − t i ) is the orthogonal projection of the mean-centred sample vector y i onto the sample vector of true score differences (t ij − t i ); we assume β > 0.
Proof strategy
In this geometrical proof, we define a tetraeder spanned by the sample vectors e, t and y (see figure) . We regard e and t as fixed and analyse how changes in retrodictive validity, cor (e, y), relate to changes in cor (t, y). Specifically, we express cor (e, y) as a function of the measurement error ε and the correlation between experimental aberration and measurement error, cor (ω, ε), and use partial derivation to investigate the impact of small changes in these quantities on retrodictive validity.
, which is negative for ε > ω 3 + ω cos α. In this case, decreasing ε increases ρ e,y . We note that this is specifically the case if − cos (α) = ρ ω,ε is positive or zero. If ε < ω 3 + ω cos α, increasing ε increases ρ e,y .
3. Since t and one adjacent right angle are fixed in T 2 , decreasing ε implies decreasing ϑ 2 , i.e. increasing ρ t,y .
4. For ρ ω,ε = 0 = cos (α), we have, from eq. (9):
Furthermore, for T 2 we have ε 2 = t 2 + y 2 − 2 t y cos ϑ 1 = 2 + 2 ω 2 + ε 2 − 2 1 + ω 2 y cos ϑ 1 ; y = 1 + ω 2 1 + ω 2 cos ϑ 1 = 1 + ω 2 cos ϑ 1 .
Inserting this into (10) gives: ρ t,y = cos ϑ 1 = 1 + ω 2 cos ϑ 2 = 1 + ω 2 ρ e,y .
